

## TECHNICAL REPORT

For The

Cargo Movement Operations System (CMOS)

SECURITY PLAN

AD-A220 218 16 April 1990

Prepared under

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## Prepared for

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
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STATEMENT "A" per Mr. Walt Dzialo SSC/Gunter AFB, AL (AV) 446-5604 TELECON 4/5/90

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## SECTION I.

INTRODUCTION. The purpose of this Technical Report is to provide the CMOS Security Plan.

SUMMARY. Not Used.

CONCLUSION. Not Used.

SECTION II.

RESULTS.

The CMOS Security Plan is provided as follows:

## SECURITY PLAN

For

CARGO MOVEMENT OPERATIONS SYSTEM (CMOS)

16 April 1990

Standard Systems Center
Deputy Chief of Staff for Acquisition
Cargo Movement Operations System Division

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

This Cargo Movement Operations System (CMOS) Security Plan is developed in accordance with AFR 205-16 and SSCR 205-1. The plan will document the relevant security requirements of CMOS

CAVGO Movement Operations System

CMOS is a top down directed program Background -(DEPSECDEF memo, 7 Sep 84) that automates base-level transportation at 240 sites worldwide. Air Force Program Management Directive (PMD) #5272(2)/38610F, Cargo Movement Operations System (CMOS), 5 Dec 86, as revised 21 June 1988, directs the development of an automated system to support regular and crisis cargo and personnel processing, documentation, movement, and tracking. The CMOS Program will be produced according to Air Force 800-series and other related regulations. Keywords: CARGO HANDLING, CMOS, Cargo Novement 1.2 Development Strategy. The Air Force has defined (1) the user requirements to be automated in Increment I and (2) the user requirements for Increment II. Increment III actions have not been initiated. Increment I provides automation of base-level traffic management which includes the preparation and reporting of cargo movement. Increment II adds war fighting capabilities for movement visibility, contingency planning, mobility execution, and force deployment. Increment III will be the vehicle for adding pre-planned product improvement.

#### 2. ORGANIZATION

The Standard Systems Center is responsible for CMOS development. The system will be contractually developed under a firm fixed price contract. Program Management will be provided by the CMOS Program Office, SSC/AQFT.

#### 3. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

AFR 205-1, Information Security Program.

AFR 205-16, Computer Security Policy.

CSC-STD-001-85, Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria.

CSC-SSTD-002-85, Password Management Guidelines.

CSC-STD-003-85, Computer Security Requirements.

CSC-STD-004-85, Technical Rationale Behind CSC-STD-003-85, Computer Security Requirements.

DOD Directive 5200.28, Security Requirements of Automated Information Systems (AIS).

## 4. OBJECTIVE

The overall objective of this plan is to establish a CMOS security program. The following paragraphs identify the major program phases and the security actions required for each of these phases.

Conceptual Phase -- The System Segment Specifications for Increments I and II distinguish the required operational capabilities, functions, and features. Relevant security requirements will be included in the Increment I requirements documents. In addition to identifying these requirements, a preliminary risk analysis will be performed. This risk analysis will examine known threats, available security countermeasures, and anticipated operational vulnerabilities. The preliminary risk analysis will become a key component of the functional baseline.

<u>Production Phase</u> -- During the production phase, the risk analysis will be updated to include those design efforts that will contribute to meeting all security requirements. Following this analysis, an update and re-publication of the risk analysis will take place.

<u>Deployment Phase</u> -- A final published risk analysis will accompany CMOS Increment I when it is deployed. Included in this deployment package will be a written certification of security measures by SSC/CC or his designated representative. MAJCOMs will update this document to reflect threats and vulnerabilities of their respective operational environment.

<u>Life-Cycle Support Phase</u> -- The Increment I Risk Analysis will be updated prior to Increment II IOC. In addition, major changes driven by Increment III task orders will require an update to the risk analysis. Otherwise, updates will be required every three years.

## 5. REQUIREMENTS

CMOS will process sensitive unclassified information. The CMOS development contractor will review with the Program Office all security related requirements and specifications.

- 5.1 Design Reviews. During design reviews (System Requirements Review, System Design Review, Preliminary Design Review, and Critical Design Review), MAJCOM representatives will be invited and encouraged to attend so that the operational user Designated Approving Authority organization will be kept abreast of all information and decisions concerning security tradeoffs, revised requirements, etc.
- 5.2 Risk Assessment. The risk analysis is the foundation for documenting system security. The analysis should:
  - (1) Identify the resources to be protected.
  - (2) Determine the threats against the resources.
  - (3) Determine the vulnerabilities of the system.
  - (4) Determine whether safeguards will lower the risk.
  - (5) Designate the certification authority and document the criteria that must be met to obtain a C2 level of trust by 1992.

It is a DOD requirement that all automated information systems, such as CMOS which process sensitive unclassified information, are secure to at least level C2 by 1992. The ways in which this requirement is met must be documented in the risk analysis.

- 5.3 Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E). ST&E serves to test security measures and to validate the assumptions about the effectiveness of existing safeguards. The results of ST&E may reveal the need to revise and repeat parts of one or more steps in the risk analysis. The following will encompass the steps of the CMOS ST&E efforts:
  - (1) Determine the Objective.
  - (2) State Assumptions.
  - (3) Describe Constraints.

- (4) Determine Test Procedures.
- (5) Execute Tests, Analyze Results, and Produce Report.
- 5.4 System Certification. Confirmation that CMOS meets all criteria for C2 level of trust is the responsibility of SSC/CC or his designated representative. The CMOS Program Office will provide recommendations and other necessary assistance to ensure the timely commpletion of this certification process.

#### 6. SUMMARY

The purpose of this plan is to document the relevant security requirements of CMOS. The tenets of the Security Plan will be adhered to throughout the CMOS life cycle.